that is becomes possible to expand the planning process in order to take hazard information into account. Finally, a simulation example demonstrates how the autonomous system determines possible future actions, evaluating them with regard to hazards in order to provide a plan with acceptable risk. Nevertheless, the approach can also be implemented to real world applications since typical real world phenomena as uncertainty and faults can also be considered in the chosen virtual world figuratively.
I. INTRODUCTION
The demand for autonomous systems (AS) is rising because of an increasing need for systems that are able to execute challenging and complex tasks in unstructured and partially unknown environments. In many cases, AS have to collab orate with humans in a natural and intuitive way and adapt themselves to varying conditions [28] . Ty pical tasks of this kind result from the field of autonomous service robots. In order to realize a high level of autonomy, the imitation of human cognition, including the representation of knowledge, learning, anticipation, planning etc. can be helpful. If an autonomous system comprises a representational level and has capabilities, like learning and planning, it can be considered as cognitive (see [25] ). However, these cognitive capabilities and the resulting highly flexible interaction with human users and the environment increase the risk that any action of the AS could injure humans or damage the environment. Depending on the system's tasks and on the environment, AS may be 978-1-4244-6588-0/10/$25.00 ©201 0 IEEE 2465 safety-critical systems that require a suitable strategy ensuring safety with humans and environment, so that no unacceptable risks exist [6] , [8] . Obviously it is impossible to foresee all complex interactions between autonomous technical systems and the environment. The definition of related safety strategies and the realization of a satisfying risk assessment during the development phase also seems to be inadequate [28] .
Hence, if the safety analysis cannot be established during the development phase sufficiently, it has to be ensured that the safety aspects are observed during operating time [28] . In order to keep the system's autonomy, these supervision mechanisms have to be realized by the system itself.
Basically, some approaches contribute to the safety of AS topic ([1], [12] , [17] , [18] ). Most of them integrate static active safety measures, which are insufficient for partial unknown environments. Actually, no contributions are known, which intend to include dynamic and principle-based active safety measures in planning capabilities of ASs.
In this contribution, a novel approach including a cognitive architecture (CA) for the realization of safe AS is presented.
The core idea is that AS have (as Cognitive Te chnical Systems (CTS)) an internal representation of the outside world. This generated or learned internal representation -a formalized description of the environment and of systemic interactionsenables the application of numerous methods. It is shown how the internal representation can be used in order to determine environmental risk information, which in turn is used for action planning of safe operation. The representation of the mental model of the CA as the action-/task-related knowledge, is extended by a risk assessment module in order to evaluate situations with the help of dynamic safety/risk models, the so-called 'safety principles (SPs)' or 'safety knowledge'. The risk assessment's outcome is a risk measure which is used for planning purposes. Furthermore, a method is introduced in order to realize a distance measure which enables identifying paths to hazardous situations.
The following sections describe the used CA as the un derlying method, its formalization of interaction, and its rep resentational level. Then, the general method for recognizing hazards in the system's environment are outlined. Finally, the implementation of the proposed approach is described and illustrated using a simulation example.
II. REALIZATION OF COGNITIVE TECHNICAL SYSTEMS
In this section, an approach for the realization of CTSs interacting autonomously with their environment is presented.
The representation of knowledge, which is the key feature of cognitive systems, is based on Situation-Operator-Modeling and implemented by high-level Petri Nets. As framework for the representational level and the cognitive functions a CA is used. Within the architecture a mental action space depending on the system's knowledge and the current situation is generated and used for planning. The following subsections describe the methodical background -the Situation-Operator
Modeling approach -and the CA.
A. Modeling and Analysis of Interactions
For the modeling of interaction, the Situation-Operator Modeling (SOM) approach (see [22] , [23] ) can be applied.
Within the SOM approach the processes in the real world are considered as sequences of scenes and actions, which are modeled as situations (time-fixed description of the consid ered system or problem) and operators (changes within the considered system) respectively. A situation Si consists of characteristics Ci and relations rio In technical systems, the characteristics can be physical values measured by the sensors.
The relations represent an inner structure of the situation, which extends the classical situation calculus (see [15] ) by linking the characteristics to each other through arbitrary functions. The operators 0i have the same quality as the relations of the situation. An operator transfers a situation to another (Oi : Sx ---+ S y ). Depending on its functionality, the char acteristics, the relations or both can be changed. The condition whether an operator can be applied is described by the oper ator's assumptions. An operator on a higher hierarchical level can be build by the combination of several operators termed as meta operator (Oi---> n : Si ---+ s n ). Furthermore, SOM realizes a graphical representation, in which situations are illustrated by gray ellipses with black dots denoting characteristics and white circles denoting relations (see Fig. 1 ). Such as the relations (or passive operators), also the active operators are represented by white circles. A detailed description about this underlying approach is given in [22] , [23] . Due to structural similarities, SOM-based models can be represented by high-level Petri Nets (HPNs), which may be modeled graphically, simulated, and analyzed by established software tools. The SOM situation can be represented by a place with one or several tokens and the SOM operator can be related to the transition with guard functions and current bindings. In this contribution, the software Renew (Reference net workshop) for Reference nets (see [13] ), a special HPN formalism, is applied. As a special feature, Renew allows the integration of Java objects and nets as tokens. However, it does not provide automated state space generation or own analysis functions, like other common HPN tools. Hence, these functionalities have to be realized by the model itself.
B. Representational Level for Cognitive Technical System
The described approach for modeling, simulation, and analysis of Human-Machine-Interaction can also be used to realize a representational level for knowledge, which is con sidered here as the key feature of cognitive systems. The 2466 representational level is realized within a CA, which simu lates human cognition from a phenomenological engineering oriented point of view and builds a unique framework (in reference to [16] ) for the realization of cognitive functions.
Represented knowledge and the whole information processing are characterized by an open and variable structure allowing moreover the reduction of complexity. Hence, the approach is not restricted to a few problems or application fields and difficult tasks/problems can be simplified with respect to the relevant aspects. Furthermore, the mentally represented or real interaction can be visualized with SOM symbolic. Hence, the process of learning and problem solving can be traced easily.
In contrast to other known CAs as [14] or [2] , the pro posed approach is basically focused on the implementation to arbitrary technical systems. However, also human behavior is considered by the underlying SOM approach which can be used to formalize the interaction between humans and technical systems. Furthermore, the architecture is characterized by the reusability of knowledge and functions as well as the portabil ity to different kinds of technical systems, which are important factors in engineering science. Additionally, the approach considers the dependency of human's perceptual capabilities on knowledge. Thus, also perception can be influenced by learning, e.g. symbols with a high abstraction level can be derived from measured data.
The proposed CA (see Fig. 1 ) comes with the known three levels for skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based decision behavior (see [19] ), which means that behaviors on all three levels are considered. Indeed, the final interaction is based on a mix of all three levels. On the skill-based level, a situation is created from sensor measurements which can be partially prefiltered. Furthermore, operators (with additional parameters or not) are executed as actions in the real world. A detailed description regarding the modeling of interac tion, knowledge representation, and cognitive functions can be found in [10] .
III. SAFETY ASPECTS OF AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS
The general safety strategy includes the detection of haz ards, evaluation, and implementing of countermeasures by de tailed examination of the system and its operating environment [6] . A fundamental problem appears, when this strategy is applied to AS: In accordance to [21] autonomy is needed, when it is difficult or impossible to foresee or plan in detail upcoming situations. For complex environments, AS have to be designed and build up without explicitly identifying the full range and scope of the interaction dynamics beforehand. Moreover, achieving emergence effects are possible by omitting inflex ible a priori plans or strategies and fixed internal functional structures [11] . Nowadays, a safety analysis neither a definable environment nor functional predefined system exists. Some few contributions (see [1] , [ 12] , [ 17] , [18] , [24] ) addressing the topic 'safety of AS' have in common stating that this problem cannot be solved.
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A. Safety in Other Related Systems and Diff erentiation
Reduction of physical risks by reducing joint stiffness in order to reduce the participated masses is already investigated in [4] . Concepts of realizing collision avoidance are investi gated in several contributions, for instance see [26] . These approaches are important to increase safety aspects of AS, albeit they cannot claim to make AS perfectly safe. Therefore, it is important to distinguish between physical and deliberative risks. The physical risks, for example a collision, can be reduced by changing of the operating parameters, the speed for instance. A superordinate layer, a deliberative layer has to recognize the changed conditions and, therefore, it has to change the operating parameters of the subordinate layers.
As decision risks are very closely related to the interaction dynamic (see [27] ) it is of central interest with respect to the design and operation of AS and is not regarded in the mentioned contributions.
In [17] and [20] a method in a deliberative context is described, how a probabilistic model can be defined to enable decision-making under considering of safety aspects. The hazard analysis -realized by a fault tree analysis -is the base of quantitative and probabilistic descriptions of accidents or hazardous events. Indeed, it is proposed to map relations between accident events and causal factors, but a 'hand crafted' fault tree analysis is suggested, observing static event combinations and static accident severity information.
In [1] it is outlined, how a certification process of AS can be realized. One central aspect of this approach is to consider possible hazards of future scenarios.
These approaches are important for increasing the safety as well, but nevertheless the dynamics of interaction with the systemic environment is neglected. For this purpose and in accordance to [28] it is proposed to supplement the traditional safety methods by adding dynamic evaluation of risks during the operating time with the help of a so-called dynamic risk assessment. The dynamic risk assessment generates risk measures with the help of generalized and dynamic hazard/risk models. These risk measures are used in the subsequent plan ning process in order to limit the system to perform safe actions or safe execution of actions, for example, slow approaching to humans or adequate usage of gripped objects. In comparison to the conventional safety strategies, the main difference of this approach is that the limitations are generated dynamically by the system itself and in accordance to its intention and its current situation. Furthermore, when the system is capable to identify hazards in order to separate at least into 'safe or unsafe regions', then the modification of the internal structure of the systems (e.g. by learning methods) can be allowed in 'safe regions' .
B. Principle-based Dynamic Risk Assessment
In the following it is shown how dynamic on-line risk analysis can be realized methodically and can be used to solve practical problems. The core idea of the contribution is that, the mental action space which represents in principle the CTS's anticipation capabilities (set of possible actions and resulting situations, see As the risk is encoded with risk values these combine both, accident severity and probability (Risk = SAce' PAce). 2) a measure of the 'distance' from actual state to any hazardous states, 3) a planning algorithm considering risk information, and 4) a method and a measure to describe the quality of the overall risk evaluation.
The first three topics are explained in detail in the following sections. The last topic is addressed in future research work.
C. Risk Function and General Risk Models
In this approach, the risk assessment is realized based on the anticipation capabilities of the underlying CTS -on the mental action space (see Fig. 2 ). Therefore, hazards have to be recognized based on a presented situation and a risk measure has to be generated. Depending on the system level, differ ent kind of hazards can occur during operation time. Every hierarchical level needs level specific risk factors [27] . Basically, it is important to formulate these as universal principles. Due to the problem that future situations are not known in detail, it seems to be reasonable to abstract the universal hazard principles from specific hazard causes, by enabling the abstraction from the observable entities to the causal relevant entities which are involved in causing the hazard. For example, a 'salad bowl' should not be deposited on the 'hot cooking plate' (specific rule) could be abstracted to 'plastic objects' should not approached to close to intense' heat sources' (principle, spatial dependence). Even if such princi ples are not true in all cases because of over-generalization, they are not wrong in 'conservative' safety concept in terms of accepting 'false alarms' in favor of avoiding 'missed alarms'.
Further exceptions in terms of refinement can be included to the knowledge under specific circumstances, hence, the system would avoid to approach 'plastic' to 'heat sources' generally.
Thus, the SPs can be formulated based on natural laws (interaction of environmental objects) or social conventions.
Basically, the principles are 'valid' premises, which can be used with ('valid') observations for deductive conclusion.
Therefore, two aspects are of central interest. First, as the safety knowledge is handcrafted initially its correctness and accuracy relies on the thoroughness of the constructors and their available information. Second, sensor-based observations are often unreliable because of its overall and dynamic accu racy. For both, safety knowledge and observation, it is essential to take uncertainty into account. For example, if there is a principle 'plastic object approached to a heat source is hazardous' with a certain evidence and there would be the observation (by perception with a certain certainty) 'plastic object is close to heat source' then the conclusion 'hazard occurs' is correct (to a certain extend).
After recognizing hazards basically, a risk value has to be defined in order to describe the risk numerically. Therefore, is is suggested that a 'risk determining instruction', as a second part, has to be linked to each SP. Risk values can be statically defined or modeled with situational dependencies, for instance with the help of fuzzy rules [27] .
Thus, the hazard causes are modeled with the help of the SP's conditional part and the respective risk is modeled in the related instruction part.
Besides the problem of reliable perception it is expected that the key problems are the complexity, completeness and correctness of the 'safety knowledge' including also adequately quantified risk measures. Basically, the problem of construc tion the safety knowledge can be solved by applying a two step approach: 1) basic and important SPs must be included beforehand 2) refinement of the principles is allowed under specific circumstances (training phase, learning by supervision etc.).
In this contribution it will be shown, how the first part can be realized. When new facts are added, the consistence of the knowledge has to be considered. Therefore, knowledge man agement methods, for example 'Truth-Maintenance-Systems', may be helpful [5] .
D. Measure of Distance to Hazardous Situations
In the latter section, it is described how risks can be rec ognized and quantified by evaluation of situations. To remain in a safe situation, situations with unacceptable risks have to be avoided [8] and therefore transitions into situations with unacceptable risk are prohibited. The risk could be reduced additionally, if a maximum 'distance' to hazardous situations is kept, using the prediction capabilities of the underlying CTS.
Which means that a certain risk aversion can be realized by assigning the risk of dangerous situations also to its neighbored situations, respectively. From that follows that a operator sequence (plan) with a higher 'distance' to dangerous situations can be favored over a operator sequence which closely passes a dangerous situation. The distance or 'safety margin' is assumed to be higher, the more operators have to be applied to reach a dangerous situation. 
P( ox,y )
By rising the transition matrix M to the power of n (M n ) the transition probabilities of applying n operators can be com puted. Furthermore, each situation Sj with i = 1 ... x contains m = 1 ... k risk values (from evaluation of k safety principles), therefore, a x x k risk matrix could be generated. The cross product of transition probability matrix M n and the transposed risk matrix generates the situational risk matrix R n = M n RIp for taking n arbitrary applied but allowed operators into account. With regard to planning actions, the k x x situational risk matrix R n can be used as a look-up table to find out which risks are available in a specific situation, including the risks that are 'radiated' from its reachable neighbored situations.
Depending on which R n is computed (with regard to n), different safety margins can be realized. The safety margin can be seen as a measure how far the foresight to hazardous situations should be. The higher the safety margin n, the wider hazardous situations can be 'circumnavigated' (risk aversion).
For instance, if a safety margin of ' l' is considered and three allowed actions in situation S2 exist, whereby one of these is leading to a 'mortal' situation S3 (severity SAcc = 1), the change from situation S1 to S2 will result to 'radiated' risk of risk1 = 33% (see Fig. 4 left) . If a safety margin of '2' is considered, the change to situation S1 (assumption: Three allowed operators in starting situation S1 and in intermediate situation S2) will result to risk1 = 0% (no danger is 'in sight' with regard to safety margin ' 1') and risk2 = 0.33 . 0.33 R; 11 % (see FigA right). From this results, that in situations with no risk (risk 11 / 2 = 0%) one/two arbitrary operators could be applied without reaching a dangerousl'mortal' situation. In the case of risk2 = 11 % it follows, that a risk of 11 % to 'die' (SAcc = 1) is present, considering the application of two arbitrary operators.
Thus, information describing the distance to dangerous situations allows 1) the reduction of the set of situations, which should be reachable by the system and 2) planning with the consideration of risk optima.
It seems to be reasonable to optimize risks also under con sideration of respective task benefit. Higher risks seem to be accepted, when the advantage to risk something is counterbal anced. 
B. Connection of Safety Principles and Action Space
The action space is a set of all possible future situations that will result from applying respective operators. A situation is a representation of the real world. The goal of the risk assessment is the evaluating of situations and therefore the actual perceived reality. As it is impossible to recognize the environment unambiguously, uncertainty should to be taken into account, but in order to simplify the complexity of this case study,
• all underlying processes are free of faults and failures, and
• the system is able to perceive its environment unambiguously.
Risks that may be provoked by the interaction with environ mental objects are taken into account because the dynamic interaction with the environment is from central interest for autonomous decisions of AS. Objects can be abstracted to attribute classes in order to generalize the hazard causes (in accordance to the ' object and attribute concept' in [3] ). This is realized by assigning attributes to objects in an object database.
The SP in turn can be related directly to objects or indirectly to attributes of objects.
The realized risk assessment program processes the an ticipated situations of the mental action space, the SPs and The conditional parts become true, if the position of the player is equal to the position of a 'mortaIJield' (which again could contain 'attributes � , acidJield' or 'monster'). The related risk is defined as I (accident severity SAee = 1 means 'death' of agent, accident probability PAce = 1 when the condition of SP is fulfilled and risk = SAec . PAce).
B. Experimental Results
The mental action space is generated based on the initial situation of the agent (lower left corner) and contains all possi ble future situations and actions. In Fig. 6 , the complete mental actions space as it results in this first simplified example, is depicted using the SOM symbolic and colors in accordance to their present risk. Here, the hostile monster and the emerald in the upper right corner are not considered for simplification.
After the generation of the mental action space, two different safety margins are evaluated. These can be identified by the indexes risk I ,risk2. The agent's 'death' is assumed to have accident severity of '1' and therefore a risk 100% ('mortal').
Situations without any risks are described with 0% risk. According to Fig. 6 , the shortest route will lead over situation S3 , 4 , 5 , 8 to the goal situation S21. This path is dangerous because it is close to the acid fields (S9 , I 0 , II: colored red).
Any decision error or exploration step will lead with high probability to the agent's 'death'.
For planning the Dijkstra algorithm is used. It generates paths under consideration of its costs. Thus, each transition from Sj ---+ S j costs: c o st i j = 1 + risk (S j ) , whereby the risk value is assumed to be expressed in percent (0 ... 100). The overall costs of the path s with the elements s o ... s n or n actions (with n E N*) are calculated c o stO , n = n + L�= 1 risk (S X ) . This example cost formula is a very safety oriented strategy. The plan with lowest costs results to costs(s: S2 , 6 , 7 , 12 , 13 , 18 , 16 , 8 , 21 ) .
The goal is reachable without any risks, when considering a safety margin of one action. The plan does not change by considering safety margin of two actions but the maxi mum risk rises to risk2 = 11.1 % and the costs amount 37 (R; 11.1 (%) + 8.3(%) + 8.3(%) + 9(steps)).
By examination of the level picture (Fig. 5) Therefore, as result an optimal plan with regard to perceived hazards is generated. The remaining risks, if available, can either be limited to an acceptable risk or counterbalanced with task fulfillment benefits.
